The Floods Before the Famine
The International Organization for Migration warned on October 21 that 874,319 people could be displaced between October and December, with flooding driving 92 percent of that total. Beletweyne faces the greatest threat, with approximately 229,000 people at risk, followed by Gaalkacyo with 82,000 . The Jubba River at Dollow is approaching flood levels, while the Shabelle River at Jowhar is rising toward the top of its banks. Heavy rains in Baidoa have already damaged homes and forced families to flee several neighborhoods .
The response is dangerously underfunded. IOM has received only 14.4 percent of the $16.62 million needed to prepare for and respond to El Niño-related flooding—funding intended to support more than 517,000 people in flood-prone communities . “We are looking at the possibility of hundreds of thousands of people losing their homes in just a matter of weeks,” said Manuel Marques Pereira, IOM Somalia Chief of Mission. “Many of these families have already been displaced before and have very little left to fall back on” .
Even before the floods arrive, hunger is already at emergency levels. The World Food Programme projects that 5.4 million people will face crisis levels of hunger or worse (IPC Phase 3+) between October and December, including nearly 1.5 million in emergency levels (IPC Phase 4). Nearly two million children under five are expected to suffer acute malnutrition, including 433,000 facing severe acute malnutrition . In Baidoa, an estimated 26,000 internally displaced people are projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and remain at risk of famine. Recent clashes have displaced more than 5,000 people, compounding needs among already vulnerable communities .
The funding gap is catastrophic. Humanitarian food assistance is projected to reach less than 5 percent of people facing crisis levels of hunger or worse, with further declines expected through December .
Baidoa: A City Trapped Between War and Hunger
Baidoa has become the epicenter of Somalia’s overlapping crises. On October 9, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, George Conway, issued a statement expressing grave concern about escalating violence in the city. “Repeated outbreaks of violence are compounding the suffering of vulnerable families, forcing people to flee their homes and further undermining their access to safety, essential services and humanitarian assistance,” he said. “This is especially alarming given the worsening humanitarian situation in Baidoa, where communities face an increased risk of famine, persistently high levels of child malnutrition and a projected risk of El Niño floods” .
The fighting in and around Baidoa pits government forces against fighters loyal to Abdiaziz Laftagareen, the former president of South West State who was ousted in March. Chatham House notes that the recent fighting around Baidoa “reportedly involved thousands of fighters and the use of drones and fighter jets” . Observers believe al-Shabaab is exploiting the political power struggle to strengthen its position in the region .
Al-Shabaab’s Deadliest Ambush
On October 26, al-Shabaab launched a coordinated attack on Turkish-trained government troops and an allied militia near Leego in the Lower Shabelle region. The group claimed to have killed 321 soldiers, a figure that could not be independently verified. The fighting lasted three hours and resulted in the seizure of prisoners, weapons, and vehicles, according to al-Shabaab’s statement .
The Somali Defense Ministry offered a different account. It said government forces killed 75 al-Shabaab militants and wounded 56 others during the operation, which was part of “Operation Banooda,” a military campaign launched days earlier across South West State. The ministry acknowledged that al-Shabaab militants attacked government troops with a vehicle laden with explosives, damaging several military vehicles .
A local livestock owner told dpa that he had seen numerous bodies in uniform scattered across the bush following the fighting. Many residents fled airstrikes, he added . The clash was one of the deadliest in recent months and underscored al-Shabaab’s continued ability to inflict significant casualties despite sustained international counter-insurgency operations.
A Political Crisis Without a Mediator
The closure of the UN political mission on October 31 removes a key channel for resolving Somalia’s political dispute. The United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) ended more than three decades of successive UN missions that helped rebuild the country after its 1991 collapse .
The government calls the closure a milestone in its ability to manage its own affairs. But opposition figures and analysts warn that it comes at a dangerous moment. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term was originally due to expire in May 2026. Parliament passed constitutional amendments in March extending presidential terms to five years, keeping him in office until May 2027. The opposition alliance—including the leadership of Puntland and Jubaland, as well as Laftagareen—rejects the extension and has also rejected the electoral commission’s announcement that polls would take place in April and May 2027 .
Mohamed Husein Gaas, director of the Mogadishu-based RAAD Peace Research Institute, warned that the mission’s departure would remove a key mediation channel. “Somalia could find itself confronting a political crisis without an agreed mechanism to contain it,” he told the Associated Press .
Foreign Rivals, Local Proxies
The political crisis is being compounded by regional rivalries. Chatham House identifies two broad, fluid blocs: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are seen as broadly aligned with the federal government, while the UAE and Israel are seen as having ties to opposition state administrations .
Turkey has backed the Hassan Sheikh administration since 2024, signing strategic agreements and running a military training camp for Somali forces. More recently, Turkish fighter jets were reportedly involved in the fighting near Baidoa—a claim Ankara has not confirmed, but which, if true, would constitute a notable direct intervention against armed political opposition . The UAE, meanwhile, maintains direct relations with Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland, with Emirati firms holding significant interests in port operations .
Chatham House’s warning is blunt: “Given the existing domestic volatility, there is a serious compound risk of newly entrenched conflict” .
A Fragile Regional Appeal
Amid the gloom, there were moments of diplomatic engagement. On October 26, President Hassan Sheikh met with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni at State House in Entebbe. Museveni urged Somali leaders to unite against al-Shabaab, arguing that “the problem of Somalia is ideological and a misdiagnosis of problems.” He added: “Unite the many to defeat the few, but some Africans want to annoy the many to stay with the few” . The two leaders also discussed expanding trade, including a proposed warehouse in Somalia for Ugandan coffee .
But such appeals have been made before, and the dynamics on the ground have not shifted. For the families in Beletweyne watching the river rise, for the displaced in Baidoa facing famine conditions, and for the soldiers mourning comrades killed near Leego, Somalia’s crises are not abstract. They are measured in lost homes, empty markets, and fresh graves. The rains are coming. The war continues. And the mediators have gone home.
