MOMBASA/ADDIS ABABA — The Intergovernmental Authority on Development enters November 2026 having secured one of its most concrete institutional wins in years: a commitment from seven member states to establish national systems for releasing disaster funds before crises strike, rather than scrambling for emergency aid after the damage is done. The Mombasa Ministerial Declaration, adopted at the end of October, commits Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, South Sudan, and Sudan to setting up anticipatory action protocols with predefined risk thresholds and financing arrangements by 2027 . It is precisely the kind of quiet, structural work that rarely makes headlines—and precisely the kind of work that could save thousands of lives if it functions as intended. Yet the declaration lands against a regional landscape in which IGAD’s diplomatic machinery is being tested simultaneously on multiple fronts: Sudan’s civil war, Somalia’s constitutional crisis, and the escalating standoff between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
The Mombasa Declaration: Financing Before the Flood
The logic behind anticipatory action is straightforward. Instead of waiting for a drought to kill livestock or a flood to displace families, governments pre-agree on triggers—rainfall deficits, river levels, early warning indicators—and pre-arrange financing that releases automatically when those thresholds are crossed. The money funds cash transfers, livestock protection, water provision, and the movement of vulnerable communities before the disaster peaks .
The Mombasa Declaration goes further than previous commitments. It calls for increased domestic investment in disaster risk reduction through dedicated budget allocations, contingency financing, risk-transfer instruments, and blended finance. Governments committed to setting national financing targets and regularly reporting on budget allocations and fund releases. IGAD’s Climate Prediction and Applications Centre will develop a regional monitoring framework and convene annual reviews of progress .
The timing is not coincidental. The World Meteorological Organization has warned that the current El Niño could be “unprecedented in strength,” with sea surface temperatures potentially reaching 3.8 degrees Celsius above average—beyond the monitoring charts used for the past four decades . IGAD’s own climate centre has identified 1997 and 2023 as analogue years, both remembered for devastating floods that killed thousands and displaced millions across the region . The declaration is an attempt to ensure that when the next flood season arrives, the money moves before the water does.
Rift Valley Fever: A New Warning
IGAD’s anticipatory machinery is already being tested by a specific and immediate threat. On November 1, the Food and Agriculture Organization and IGAD issued a joint alert warning that El Niño-driven heavy rainfall and flooding are increasing the risk of Rift Valley fever outbreaks across Eastern Africa. The countries assessed as facing the highest risk are Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda .
Rift Valley fever is a viral disease that affects livestock—sheep, goats, cattle, buffaloes, and camels—and can also infect humans through direct contact with infected animals or animal products. Heavy rainfall expands mosquito breeding sites, and the movement of infected animals can spread the virus geographically. The FAO’s early warning tool indicates that conditions suitable for transmission are expected to increase across much of Eastern Africa between October 2026 and January 2027. Tanzania currently has the largest area classified as suitable for transmission, followed by Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, and southern Sudan .
The alert calls on affected countries to strengthen risk-based surveillance, pre-position vaccines and essential supplies, and enhance cross-sectoral and cross-border coordination through a One Health approach. It is, in effect, a test case for the Mombasa Declaration’s promise: can the region act on a forecast before the outbreak becomes an epidemic?
Sudan: The Quintet Meets, But the War Continues
While IGAD’s climate and disaster work advances, its diplomatic track on Sudan remains mired in the gap between coordination and consequences. On October 12, a delegation of anti-war Sudanese civil forces led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok met with the Quintet Mechanism—the African Union, United Nations, European Union, Arab League, and IGAD—at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. The delegation presented a vision for a Sudanese-led peace process beginning with an immediate and unconditional humanitarian truce, leading to a permanent ceasefire and a democratic civilian transition .
The meeting was significant in one respect: it brought civilian forces into direct dialogue with the mediators after previous rounds were boycotted over disagreements about participation criteria. The delegation called for a joint preparatory committee to set the agenda, determine participants, and select venues for future talks. It also urged mediators to coordinate under a unified framework bringing together the Quad—the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE—and the Quintet, and to extend the arms embargo to cover all of Sudan .
But the meeting produced no ceasefire, no humanitarian truce, and no timeline for direct negotiations between the warring parties. The UN envoy to Sudan, Pekka Haavisto, acknowledged that the confidence-building measures under discussion—a prisoner exchange and facilitating secondary school examinations—were “small steps” compared to the scale of destruction. He warned that the war economy, fueled by gold and natural resources, is making a settlement increasingly difficult . IGAD’s role in the Quintet gives it a seat at the table, but the table has yet to produce a deal.
Somalia: Dialogue Urged, but the Crisis Deepens
On Somalia, IGAD has issued statements urging continued dialogue between the federal government and the opposition Somali Future Council, calling on all parties to prioritize the interests of the Somali people and seek peaceful solutions through consensus. The bloc reaffirmed its solidarity with Somalia and its readiness to support efforts promoting dialogue, national cohesion, and lasting stability .
But the gap between IGAD’s appeals and the reality on the ground is widening. The UN Security Council is scheduled to hold a special meeting in November on Somalia, focusing on the future of the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia, sanctions against al-Shabaab, and the mission’s financial challenges. The Security Council report expresses concern over the ongoing political conflict, noting that talks between the federal government and the opposition have yet to yield an agreement on constitutional amendments, the presidential term limit, or the electoral process .
IGAD’s diplomatic weight in Somalia is real—it is one of the regional bodies whose calls for dialogue carry moral authority. But moral authority has not resolved the dispute over President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term extension, nor has it stopped the armed clashes in Mogadishu and Baidoa. The closure of the UN political mission on October 31 removed a key mediation channel, leaving IGAD and the African Union as the primary external actors capable of convening the parties. Whether they can do so before the crisis escalates further is an open question.
The Ethiopia-Eritrea Front: IGAD’s Most Dangerous Blind Spot
The most dangerous crisis in the region is one that IGAD has struggled to address directly: the escalating confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Fighting between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces was reported along the Egela-Tsorona front in late October, and Ethiopian troops have advanced to Zalambessa, a strategic town on the Eritrean frontier. Eritrea has asked the UN Security Council to take “deterrent measures” against what it calls Ethiopia’s “declaration of war.”
IGAD’s capacity to mediate this crisis is limited by a structural reality: Eritrea is not a member of IGAD. It withdrew from the organization in 2007 and has shown no willingness to rejoin. IGAD cannot convene a party that refuses to sit at its table. The African Union and the United Nations are the primary venues for Ethiopia-Eritrea mediation, and IGAD’s role is necessarily secondary.
What IGAD can do—and has done through its climate and early warning work—is prepare for the consequences. If the Ethiopia-Eritrea standoff escalates into full-scale war, the displacement and humanitarian needs will fall disproportionately on IGAD member states. The Mombasa Declaration’s call for stronger cross-border coordination and joint anticipatory action plans for forced displacement is, in this light, not merely a climate adaptation measure but a conflict preparedness one .
The Institution and the Emergency
IGAD today is an organization that has learned to build systems. The Mombasa Declaration, the Rift Valley fever alert, the Quintet coordination on Sudan, the calls for dialogue on Somalia—these are the products of an institution that understands its role and is trying to perform it with the tools available. The 2023 Treaty’s entry into force in September gave IGAD a stronger legal foundation. The anticipatory financing commitment gives it a concrete deliverable.
But the crises it confronts are not waiting for institutional maturation. Sudan’s war continues without a ceasefire. Somalia’s political dispute has turned violent. Ethiopia and Eritrea are closer to war than at any point since 2000. IGAD’s value lies in its convening power and its capacity to build frameworks that shape how the region responds to the next shock. Whether those frameworks are ready before the next shock arrives is the question that will define IGAD’s relevance in the months ahead.
