MOGADISHU — Somalia’s political crisis has entered its most dangerous phase yet. On November 5, the country’s Supreme Court ruled that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s constitutional mandate expired on May 15, 2026, and ordered elections to be held within 90 days. The government’s response was not compliance. It was defiance. The Attorney General rejected the ruling’s timeline, the presidency had already dismissed the Chief Justice who signed it, and by November 7 a replacement had been sworn in. The standoff between the executive and the judiciary has now become the central axis of a crisis that threatens to turn Somalia’s electoral dispute into armed conflict.
The Court Ruling and the Judicial Purge
The Supreme Court’s five-judge panel found that the constitutional amendments passed in March, which extended presidential and parliamentary terms from four to five years, did not explicitly apply to officials already in office. President Mohamud’s mandate, the court ruled, ended on May 15. Parliament’s and the cabinet’s mandates ended on April 14. The judges limited the government to routine administration and gave political leaders 30 days to agree on an election framework and 90 days to hold elections .
The ruling was remarkable not only for its content but for the sequence that preceded it. On November 4, one day before the judgment, President Mohamud dismissed Chief Justice Baashe Yusuf Ahmed. The Supreme Court declared the dismissal “null and void” the following day, citing illegitimate executive interference. But the presidency proceeded with the swearing-in of Ibrahim Idle Suleiman as the new Chief Justice on November 7 .
The Somalia Future Council—a coalition bringing together Puntland, Jubaland, and the Mogadishu-based Salvation Forum—described the dismissal as a coup. It alleged that federal security agencies were searching for the ousted Chief Justice and welcomed the court’s election ruling . Former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire accused the president of launching an “assault on the Supreme Court” and attempting to apprehend the sitting chief justice. Former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed said the country was facing “a grave political crisis” .
The Government’s Rejection
The federal government has not accepted the court’s authority to dictate the election timetable. Attorney General Sulayman Mohamed argued that the judges should have ruled on the government’s objections to the court’s jurisdiction before deciding the case. The election commission’s schedule—parliamentary polls on April 15, 2027, and presidential elections a month later—remains the government’s preferred timeline .
President Mohamud had invited opposition and civil society representatives to talks in Mogadishu from November 14 to 18, but rival factions question his standing to host discussions after the court found his mandate expired . The government’s position is that the constitutional amendments are legally binding and that it retains the authority to govern until the new election date. The opposition’s position is that the government is illegitimate and that any dialogue hosted by Mohamud is a farce.
The Armed Dimension
The political dispute has already turned violent. ACLED recorded 12 political violence events linked to electoral disputes or opposition to the federal government during the first 10 days of November. Seven took place in Southwest State, including clashes linked to the prolonged regional election dispute, while three involved clan militias in Hiiraan opposing the Hirshabelle state election. These incidents displaced more than 5,600 civilians, including over 4,500 women and children .
The risk is that this localized violence escalates into something broader. ACLED’s Somalia analyst warns that the federal government is deploying additional forces to confront opposition groups, while opposition figures are calling on clan militias for protection. “This creates a risk that political disagreements could develop into armed confrontations between government forces and local groups” . The clashes in Mogadishu and Baidoa earlier this year demonstrated that both sides are willing to use force.
Foreign Rivalries and a Widening War
The domestic crisis is being compounded by regional rivalries that have turned Somalia into another arena in the competition between Turkey and the UAE. Turkey is seen as backing the federal government, providing military training and operating Mogadishu’s airport and seaport. The UAE has maintained direct relations with Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland, with Emirati firms holding significant interests in port operations .
Chatham House warns that these dynamics are “helping to both incentivize new alliances and deepen divisions.” Puntland and Somaliland formed an alliance in response to the federal government’s creation of North East State in 2025. Local actors are increasingly looking outward for foreign backing to shore up their domestic interests. “Given the existing domestic volatility, there is a serious compound risk of newly entrenched conflict” .
The Security Vacuum
The political crisis is unfolding as Somalia’s security architecture is being dismantled. Uganda, the largest troop contributor to the African Union mission, has begun withdrawing its forces, with an initial contingent of 109 soldiers departing Mogadishu. The withdrawal comes amid severe funding shortfalls that have affected logistics, supplies to forward bases, and routine patrols .
Samira Gaid, a regional security analyst, warned that the transition strategy rests on two assumptions that are now questionable: that Somali forces will expand their capabilities to fill the gaps, and that international partners will maintain funding until the handoff is complete. “Without logistics, it is unclear if the mission can actually survive,” she said. “Uganda’s decision signals that” .
Defence Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi has warned that the political tensions could threaten the country’s security gains. “We have done so much to bring in considerable gains to the country. We are determined to safeguard that at a cost. Nobody will destabilise us, that is a guarantee” . But the government’s focus on political survival is diverting attention and resources from the fight against al-Shabaab, which continues to hold territory and launch attacks.
The Closure of the UN Mission
The crisis has been made harder to resolve by the closure of the UN political mission on October 31, after more than three decades of operations. The United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia had served as a key mediation channel between the federal government and opposition. Its departure removed an impartial broker at precisely the moment when one was most needed. The Associated Press reported that Somali leaders had not yet agreed on a replacement mediator for the election dispute .
Turkey has attempted to fill the gap, hosting talks between the government and opposition in July. But those talks ended without agreement after Puntland and Jubaland withdrew, accusing Mohamud of insufficient flexibility . The opposition is fragmented, with multiple blocs holding different positions and priorities, complicating any unified negotiating stance.
A Country at a Crossroads
Somalia’s political crisis is not a dispute about procedure. It is a contest over whether power will be transferred through negotiation or imposed through force. The government’s refusal to accept the court’s ruling, its dismissal of the Chief Justice, and its insistence on a 2027 election timeline all point in one direction: the consolidation of executive power regardless of constitutional constraints. The opposition’s willingness to mobilize clan militias and foreign backers points in another: resistance by any means available.
For the 5,600 civilians displaced in the first ten days of November, for the families in Baidoa and Mogadishu who have already fled fighting once, and for the Somali forces preparing to take over from departing Ugandan troops, the constitutional debate is an abstraction. What matters is whether the next clash happens in a courtroom or on a street, whether the next election is held or postponed indefinitely, and whether the country’s political leaders can find a path back from the brink. The court has ruled. The government has refused. The militias are waiting.
