KAMPALA/MOGADISHU — Uganda’s military presence in Somalia, the longest and largest of any African Union troop contributor, is winding down under the weight of financial strain, political shifts, and the persistent lethality of al-Shabaab. The past month has delivered both the trigger and the context for the drawdown: a deadly ambush that killed at least a dozen Ugandan soldiers in Lower Shabelle, followed within weeks by the announcement that the Uganda People’s Defence Forces would begin withdrawing from Somalia after nearly two decades of deployment.

The Ambush at Gorowen

The most recent significant combat action involving Ugandan forces occurred on October 4, when al-Shabaab fighters ambushed a joint African Union and Somali National Army patrol along the Mogadishu-Barawe Main Supply Route. The attack took place at Gorowen town, between Bulumaler and Beladamini in the Lower Shabelle region, about 140 kilometers southwest of Mogadishu .

Brigadier Richard Karemire, the UPDF spokesperson, initially issued a statement confirming fatalities without providing numbers. By the following morning, he confirmed that 12 Ugandan soldiers had been killed and seven wounded, with the dead and injured evacuated to the Mogadishu Level II Hospital . Karemire dismissed conflicting reports from military sources who claimed the toll was 21 dead and nine seriously injured, attributing the higher figures to “al-Shabaab propaganda” .

Al-Shabaab’s own account was predictably inflated. A senior al-Shabaab military officer told Reuters that the group had killed at least 39 AMISOM troops, including a commander . The discrepancy between official and militant figures is a recurring feature of casualty reporting in Somalia, and independent verification remains impossible.

The ambush was the first major al-Shabaab attack on Ugandan forces since September 2015, when the UPDF lost at least 19 soldiers in a similar assault . It served as a blunt reminder that despite nearly twenty years of operations, the insurgent threat remains potent.

The Withdrawal Announcement

On October 29, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces, announced on X that the withdrawal had begun. “As we promised, we have started withdrawing UPDF from Somalia. After 20 years of a lot of blood and sacrifice we are handing over security to our Somali brothers,” he wrote .

The UPDF statement issued on November 2 clarified the scope: the drawdown would begin with troops deployed under bilateral arrangements with the Federal Government of Somalia, with the first cohort already back in Uganda. The statement added that Uganda would gradually withdraw all its forces, including those under the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), by the close of 2027 .

The numbers involved are substantial. Uganda is the largest troop contributor to AUSSOM, with approximately 4,500 soldiers under the AU mission alongside roughly 2,000 deployed through bilateral arrangements . The first 109 soldiers departed Mogadishu at the end of October .

Why Now: Money, Politics, and a Shifting Mission

The withdrawal is not a sudden decision. It reflects a convergence of pressures that have been building for months.

Financial strain is the most immediate driver. In July 2026, the United States informed the African Union that it would not support renewing AUSSOM’s mandate before the UN Security Council in December, alongside a 25 percent funding cut by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) that has impacted frontline operations . Washington, the coalition’s largest donor, has voiced frustration with the lack of progress against al-Shabaab and accused Mogadishu of failing to unite the country and implement political reforms .

Diplomatic shifts have compounded the financial pressure. The closure of the UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia on October 31, after more than three decades of peace-building, removed a key international presence . The political crisis in Mogadishu—with armed clashes between government forces and opposition-allied fighters—has further complicated the security environment.

President Museveni had anticipated the funding cuts. Addressing an extraordinary summit of troop-contributing countries in July, he declared: “If the international community wants to pull out, let them. All the problems we have solved here, we solved without their support… Somalia will not be abandoned. We have the capacity. Whether others pull out or not, we shall stand” . But capacity and willingness are different things, and the UPDF’s announcement suggests that Kampala has concluded the costs now outweigh the benefits.

The Security Gap

The withdrawal creates an immediate risk of a security vacuum in areas Ugandan forces have held. The African Union is planning to move peacekeepers from Barawe, 135 miles southwest of Mogadishu, to replace outgoing Ugandan troops at four bases—Sabid-Anole, Bariire, Awdheegle, and Bulonagad—deemed critical to protecting the capital. Failure to do so, analysts warn, would allow al-Shabaab to exploit the gap .

Barawe is a strategically important coastal town and port, and Shalanbood, another facility vacated by Ugandan forces, is a key settlement along a major transport corridor in Lower Shabelle, a region where al-Shabaab maintains a significant presence . Somalia’s foreign affairs minister, Ali Omar, acknowledged that “things are not dire now,” but cautioned that a sudden withdrawal could “create problems” .

The Somali National Army’s preparedness to assume greater responsibility is the central question. Uganda was the first country to deploy to Somalia in March 2007 under AMISOM, when Ugandan forces controlled less than 10 percent of Mogadishu and the rest was in al-Shabaab’s hands . Over nearly two decades, Ugandan troops pushed the militants more than 200 kilometers from the capital and secured key government installations . Whether those gains can be sustained without them is uncertain.

A Complicated Legacy

Uganda’s deployment has come at a significant human cost. The October ambush was only the latest in a long series of deadly attacks. In September 2015, at least 19 UPDF soldiers were killed in a major assault. In 2014, an al-Shabaab attack on an AMISOM officers’ mess in Mogadishu killed three soldiers. In 2010, four UPDF soldiers died in an attack on the presidential palace .

The mission also had its successes. Ugandan forces played a central role in liberating Mogadishu and large parts of Lower Shabelle from al-Shabaab control, and in protecting the transitional government that allowed Somalia to begin rebuilding its institutions . The UPDF’s presence demystified the prediction that AMISOM was “dead on arrival” and opened the way for other countries to contribute troops .

But the withdrawal leaves unfinished business. Al-Shabaab remains capable of launching sophisticated attacks, as the October ambush demonstrated. The Somali government remains divided and distracted by political infighting. And the international funding that sustained the mission is drying up.

What Comes Next

The UPDF’s phased withdrawal is scheduled to conclude by the end of 2027, but the timeline could accelerate if conditions deteriorate. A 12-month transition plan is due to begin in January, giving Somalia and the African Union time to seek alternative funding sources .

For Uganda, the withdrawal marks the end of a military engagement that defined its role as a regional security provider. For Somalia, it removes the largest and most experienced contingent from a mission that is already struggling. And for al-Shabaab, it offers an opportunity to exploit the gaps left behind.

The ambush at Gorowen was a warning. The withdrawal that followed was an acknowledgment that warnings can be ignored for only so long. Uganda’s soldiers are coming home, and the security they provided is being handed over to forces that have not yet proven they can hold it.

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